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Abstract This report surveys four approaches that are pivotal to the study of pref-
erence formation: (a) the range, validity, and theoretical foundations of explanations
of political preferences at the individual and mass levels, (b) the exploration of key
objects of preference formation attached to the democratic political process (i.e., vot-
ing in competitive elections), (c) the top-down vs. bottom-up character of preference
formation as addressed in leader–follower studies, and (d) gene–environment inter-
action and the explanatory weight of genetic predisposition against the cumulative
weight of social experiences.
In recent years, our understanding of sites and processes of (individual) political-
preference formation has substantially improved. First, this applies to a greater
variety of objects that provide fresh insight into the functioning and stability of
contemporary democracy. Second, we observe the reaffirmation of pivotal theories
and key concepts in adapted form against widespread challenge. This applies to the
role played by social stratification, group awareness, and individual-level economic
considerations. Most of these findings converge in recognising economics-based
explanations. Third, research into gene–environment interplay rapidly increases the
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number of testable hypotheses and promises to benefit a wide range of approaches
already taken and advanced in the study of political-preference formation.
Keywords Economic voting · Genetic research · Political leadership · Social
class · Spatial theory
Wahrscheinlichkeiten und Anteile: Bildung politischer Präferenzen in
postindustriellen Demokratien
Zusammenfassung Dieser Literaturbericht orientiert sich an vier Zugängen bzw.
Blickwinkeln, welche die Erforschung der Bildung politischer Präferenzen prägen:
(1) die Reichweite, Validität und theoretischen Grundlagen von Erklärungsmodellen
auf individueller und Massenebene, (2) die Ergründung von Objekten der Präfe-
renzbildung, die von zentraler Bedeutung für den demokratischen Prozess sind,
(3) der Top-down- vs. Bottom-up-Charakter der Präferenzbildung, wie er exem-
plarisch in der Leader-follower-Literatur der Leadership-Forschung in Erscheinung
tritt, sowie (4) das Zusammen- und Wechselspiel von Genetik und Umwelt und der
Erklärungsgehalt genetischer Prägung gegenüber den (kumulativen) Einflüssen so-
zialer Erfahrungen. Diese Forschung hat in der jüngeren Vergangenheit zu einem
stark verbesserten Verständnis der Prozesse der Präferenzbildung geführt. Erstens
hat sie den Erkenntnisradius erweitert und schließt nun etliche neue Objekte der
Präferenzbildung ein, die von wesentlicher Bedeutung für das Funktionieren zeitge-
nössischer Demokratie sind. Zweitens finden zentrale ältere Theorien und Konzepte
in modifizierter Form Bestätigung. Das betrifft etwa die Rolle sozialer Schichtung,
von Gruppenbewusstsein und individuellen wirtschaftlichen Abwägungen. Die meis-
ten dieser Befunde verweisen auf eine anhaltende Bedeutung wirtschaftsorientierter
Erklärungsansätze. Drittens ermöglicht die – methodisch anspruchs- und voraus-
setzungsvolle – Erforschung des Wechselspiels zwischen genetisch bedingter Ver-
anlagung und Umweltbedingungen ein Ergründen neuer Testhypothesen und geht
mit dem Versprechen einher, bereits etablierte Zugänge zu befruchten bzw. neu zu
beleben.
Schlüsselwörter Ökonomisches Wählen · Genetik · Politische Führung ·
Klassentheorie · Räumliche Modelle
1 Introduction and Rationale
In democracies, institutional rules are designed to hold leaders accountable and keep
them responsive to the diverse political preferences of the electorate. Preferences rest
upon notions of comparative evaluation as part of a larger internal process through
which “individuals convert information from their environment into evaluations of
political objects” (Druckman and Lupia 2000, p. 8). At the most generalised level
and based upon the misleading assumption of full disclosure of their content, these
are often referred to as “popular will” in public discourse.
K
A Tale of Odds and Ratios: Political Preference Formation in Postindustrial Democracies
While care should be taken regarding the pitfalls attached to the perception and
interpretation of highly aggregated manifestations of political preferences (“mean-
ingless amalgamations,” according to William Riker’s verdict; Riker 1982, p. xviii),
it is of particular interest to political scientists to ask what accounts for their for-
mation in the first place. In recent years, our understanding of sites and processes
of (individual) political-preference formation has substantially improved. For in-
stance, political science has progressed swiftly beyond the simplifying assumptions
posed by historical cleavage theory and formal spatial theory, with their common
emphasis on competition in the policy domain (Kitschelt 2000). In the field of po-
litical economy and political sociology, scholars have adapted social class schemes
to the landscapes of professional differentiation prevalent in postindustrial societies
(e.g., Oesch 2008). Similarly, common perspectives on leadership roles are being
reevaluated: Electoral studies have repeatedly highlighted the important influence
that leaders can have on voters’ beliefs and behaviour. Furthermore, the call for
more follower-centric research has grown steadily louder among scholars of politi-
cal leadership (Hartley 2018, pp. 209–210).
This review of the literature is concerned with the origins of political preferences
and the ways in which they are shaped. It offers a condensed summary of the state
of the art and provides a navigation instrument in a vibrant field that is characterised
by a combination of multilayered innovations and burdening segmentation. Contem-
porary research offers a mix of methodological innovation, conceptual clarification,
and theory formation that promises to benefit many areas of comparative political
research. This research is important also because modes of preference formation, for
example, are tightly linked to vital questions of democratic stability, performance,
and even survival (e.g., Schedler and Sarsfield 2007; Gherghina and Geissel 2017).
This report surveys four approaches that are pivotal to the study of preference
formation: (a) the range, validity, and theoretical foundations of explanations of po-
litical preferences at the individual and mass levels, (b) the exploration of key objects
of preference formation attached to the democratic political process (i.e., voting in
competitive elections), (c) the top-down vs. bottom-up character of preference for-
mation as addressed in leader–follower studies, which has gained prominence due
to the trend of personalisation of politics, and (d) gene–environment interaction and
the explanatory weight of genetic predisposition against the cumulative weight of
social experiences. Each section of the report can be read individually, but the links
between these four approaches are made apparent. We provide information on what
sets of preferences are addressed by each strand of research, the methods researchers
employ, opportunities for interdisciplinary facilitation (e.g., in combination with ge-
netics, labour psychology, and experimental design), and whether recent insights
amount to breakthroughs in terms of concept formation and/or the advancement of
theoretical propositions.
This survey focuses on stages, sites, and the interpersonal logic of preference
formation at the expense of the role of institutions in structuring citizens’ need to
act strategically (e.g., in connection with solving collective-action problems). We do
not seek a novel explanation (or theory thereof) of political-preference formation,
but instead introduce the main approaches, core issues, and key findings in this area.
The report concludes by identifying common themes at the heart of this research
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and by identifying areas of common ground that may offer a place where research
efforts from different specialties may come together to further the understanding of
political-preference formation.
2 Political Conflict and Competition
Scholarly understanding of political representation has long been guided by two
theories of voting: formal spatial theory and cleavage theory. Both are theories of
competition in the democratic marketplace that can explain party system dynamics,
policy outcomes, and the quality of representation. However, they also address ques-
tions of formation, durability, distribution, and composition of preferences. Here the
focus is on processes during which voters form preferences as rankings derived from
comparative evaluations over limited choice sets.
2.1 Ideological Proximity and the Pursuit of Self-interest
Formal spatial theory, inspired by Downs (1957), describes an integrated theory
of vote choice, party platform selection, and the quality of outcomes (Hinich and
Munger 1997). It is premised on the idea of self-interested choice mediated through
ideological proximity. Its key assumption regarding voter preferences is unidimen-
sionality, with each individual voter’s preferences single-peaked and the distribution
of preferences of all voters approximating a bell-shaped curve (normal, Gaussian
distribution). This and other assumptions have come under criticism, and instead
a push has been made towards establishing a unified theory of voting, including
(a) the number of policy dimensions citing cognitive barriers, (b) the empirical
distribution of preferences in the electorate, (c) spatial/directional modelling, and
(d) programmatic convergence of parties in order to win over the median voter (for
a summary, see Iversen 1994; Adams et al. 2005).
Although spatial modelling has inspired a number of new concepts, most notably
veto player theory (Tsebelis 2002), it has more recently been superseded by the
concepts of issue salience and issue ownership of parties. These latter concepts have
proved to be rather successful in replacing spatial modelling, which has seen refu-
tation in the analysis of the behaviour of many parties, outcomes of elections, and
effects of institutional landscapes in nonmajoritarian systems of governing (Stadel-
mann et al. 2019; Dennison 2019). Issue salience, on the contrary, is associated with
contemporary research on the rise of challenger parties, niche parties, and business-
firm parties under entrepreneurial leadership.
Regarding issue ownership of parties, as Bélanger and Meguid (2008) have
demonstrated, this phenomenon (Petrocik 1996) guides voters’ party preferences
only on a selected number of highly salient issues. These often concern valence
issues, such as economic voting (see section 3.1). Both mainstream establishment
and challenger parties may be forced to engage in “politics of competence” (Green
and Jennings 2017), for example when issue ownership passes over from one party
to another in times of political or economic shock, and/or because of the costs at-
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tached to governing in terms of shrinking vote share.1 It has also been suggested that
for many voters, the significance of ownership hinges upon the credibility of issue-
owning parties’ claims to care about implementation (Lachat 2014)—evidence that
supports perceptions of voters as working around institutions (e.g., rating chances
for supported parties to enter government, improvement by greater ideological prox-
imity compared with the status quo) as featured in the concept of strategic voting.
2.2 Cleavage Theory and Mass Behaviour
In contrast to spatial theory, the Rokkanian theory of social cleavages seeks to
explain mass political behaviour (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Bartolini and Mair 1990).
Its proponents argue that European party systems are shaped by major historical
conflicts over religion, class, and state building that have occurred in modern times.
The sequential interaction of these conflicts gave way to stable patterns of sets of
preferences and political alliances that became locked into a sociopolitical status
quo (“frozen party systems”).
Some authors assert that the increasing fluidity of party systems does not invali-
date cleavage theory. In this vein, Hooghe and Marks (2018) contend that established
parties absorb new cleavages through previously held ideology and commitments.
However, given the transformative nature of, in the European context, supranational
integration, these parties cannot prevent the rise of challenger parties. Traditional
parties face various restrictions (“bounded rationality”) that prevent them from tak-
ing positions that cut across old and new cleavage structures (Bornschier 2009).
They therefore fail to undermine the electoral efforts of challenger parties.
Authors who attribute the continued success of right-wing populist and leftist-
libertarian parties to the unleashed forces of globalisation follow a similar trajectory.
Merkel and Zürn (2019) argue that opposition to its multifaceted consequences, in
particular multiculturalism, resulted in an emerging communitarian–cosmopolitan
cleavage also thanks to representational gaps. This new transnational cleavage in-
corporates some traditional cleavages (e.g., the center–periphery antagonism and
the urban–rural divide) while it cuts across others (e.g., the capital–labour conflict)
(Merkel and Zürn 2019, p. 97). Norris and Inglehart (2019) go further in explaining
the recent series of major populist decisions (e.g., Brexit and the election of Don-
ald Trump) in noneconomic terms as a “cultural backlash.” This, however, stands
in contrast to findings in the study of opinion formation and vote choice. In fact,
political divides along new social risks caused by globalisation and welfare-state
retrenchment (e.g., higher exposure to risk of unemployment and lower social ben-
efits associated with atypical employment) and positions regarding immigration and
supranationalism do not seem to have greatly diminished the explanatory power of
traditional cleavages for mass behaviour, certainly not when it comes to social class
(see section 3.3). These new divides share the ability to predict voter preferences at
the group level (Enyedi 2008).
In support of both cleavage theory and concepts of issue salience/ownership,
there is no indication that a pluralisation of lifestyle and employment situations,
1 The recent successes of Blue Toryism in the U.S. and the UK come to mind as an example.
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a loosening of tight links between parties and their voters (dealignment; Dalton
and Wattenberg 2000), and, to some extent, responsible partisan government gave
way to an atomisation of preferences at the individual level or random clustering
of preferences across salient political issues. This is indicated, for example, in the
realignment of parts of the working class that fuels right-wing populist parties’
electoral successes (Arzheimer 2008). At the end of the day, it is still just a handful
of party families and party types that take the lion’s share of votes in general
elections.
What are the types of policies that drive vote choice? For decades and gen-
erations, citizens’ policy preferences had been mapped onto a single dimension.
Voters, politicians, and political scientists had been attracted almost unanimously
by the simplicity of this left–right scale (Benoit and Laver 2006). However, while
several noteworthy empirical studies continue to generate support for this concept
(e.g., Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009), the emerging consensus has shifted to
n-dimensional packaging of underlying preference structures.2
The items that constitute each dimension are contested within limits. For postin-
dustrial societies in Western Europe, Kriesi et al. (2006) highlight the impact of
European integration as a driving force of preference formation, while Kitschelt
and Rehm’s (2015) cultural dimension rests upon the collapsing of two separate
subdimensions (sociopolitical governance and sociocultural), which points to the
salience of migration and identity politics. Häusermann and Kriesi (2015) instead
argue that the political space of individual-level voter preferences is characterised
rather uniformly throughout European polities by a blurring of the boundaries be-
tween economic and cultural conflict. First, they ascribe this effect to the increasing
salience of distributive questions regarding welfare chauvinism and welfare misuse,
a set of issues tied in large part to supranational integration and immigration. They
also regard issues such as redistribution, social investment, and social insurance as
not unconditionally aligning on a single dimension.
2.3 Nonpolicy Modes of Evaluation
In line with key propositions advanced in spatial modelling, cleavage theory as
highlighted in the responsible partisan government tradition confines itself to policies
as objects of preference formation. While this specialisation adheres to common
ideals of democratic accountability and has enabled a profound understanding of
policy-based chains and gaps of representation, it neglects other domains of voter
reasoning.
2 In a nutshell, postmaterialism and a pluralisation of lifestyle choices have resulted in the emergence of
a culturally defined preference dimension that complements rather than replaces the traditional socioeco-
nomically defined (left–right) axis (e.g., Oesch 2012; Rovny 2013). Phenomena such as logrolling, arrow
paradox, cyclical majorities, and manipulative framing represent procedural and communicative obstacles
to the emergence of coherent preferences on political issues, let alone issue packages and dimensions
(Bernholz 1973; Neufeld et al. 1994). However, as Druckman (2004) illustrates, elite competition and
interpersonal conversations can overcome these restrictions. Based on experimental design and survey ev-
idence, Lavine et al. (2012) found ambivalent partisanship to facilitate reliance on material interest and
core political values. All this evidence points to voters as cognitive misers.
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What are the political means and ends that motivate citizens, and which represent
their objects of preference formation? Kitschelt and his collaborators on the Demo-
cratic Accountability and Linkages Project have strongly argued that representation
stretches far beyond policy-based programmatic demand (Kitschelt et al. 2009). In
the Western policy–based tradition of cleavage theory and formal spatial theory,
other spheres of crafting democratic accountability have received much less atten-
tion. This applies to (a) clientelism as part of the world of instrumental calculation
and (b) several entities representing the sphere of emotional reasoning, including
party identification, charismatic leadership, and ascriptive (formal) representation
(Kitschelt 2000).
Citizens form and hold preferences over all these political deliverables. They
guide parties’ and candidates’ choices when deciding to direct their resources with
the aim of appealing to voters. In short, while most studies confine themselves to
looking at the programmatic structuration of the democratic marketplace, not all
voters focus on policy considerations, nor do all voters treat their most important
sets of preferences, which are informed by different objects, as separate. Typically,
many tend to blend various modes of linkage building. For instance, voters evaluate
a political leader’s character and competence through the prism of the ideological
blueprint of that candidate’s party-family membership (Bittner 2011). Another way
in which voters bridge instrumental and affective reasoning is in the assignment
of issue competence to certain parties, which is mediated through aspects of party
identification for most voters, not only party identifiers (Stubager and Slothuus
2013). Finally, it is in the nature of coalition preferences and various forms of
strategic voting to incorporate a variety of types of linkages (Plescia and Aichholzer
2017).
The instrumental case of clientelism is somewhat special. A weakness of much
of the literature is that it fails to fully appreciate the presence and impact of clien-
telism on both the supply and demand sides of political competition in mature,
affluent democracies. Except for the narrowed-down question of electoral punish-
ment for welfare retrenchment (e.g., Giger and Nelson 2011), the effect of parties’
clientelistic engagement in serving individual and group-based preferences remains
largely unaddressed (for the U.S., see Ansolabehere and Snyder 2006). The reason
for this seems to be a tight perceptual association of clientelism with premodern
authoritarian settings and nondemocratic practice.3 In the end, the transactional na-
ture of particularistic voting serves rather conventional ends such as jobs, housing,
procurement, and social policy. However, it does so at the expense of universalistic-
egalitarian values (Rawls 1971).
3 Economic Evaluation and Social Class Revisited
Citizens form preferences over all sorts of political issues, content, and outcomes.
What are common or central objects of preferences to which people pay attention,
3 Tellingly, the special issue on “comparing patronage democracies” of Democratization (January 2020)
limits itself to highly defective electoral democracies. For the emerging Polish case, see Markowski (2019).
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and where does this attention prompt acts of comparative evaluation and ranking?
Economic well-being figures prominently among voter reasoning and is treated
by voters as both a set of valence issues and a set of positional issues. Research
on preferences regarding socioeconomic policies and performances grapples with
virtually all major competing theoretical perspectives in the study of preference
formation. This includes retrospective voting, the role of an individual’s sociotropic
considerations, and the dynamic nature of preferences over salient issues.
3.1 Economic Voting
As Druckman and Lupia (2000) remind us, selective memory and attentiveness play
a crucial role in the regulation of processes of preference formation. Both aspects are
highlighted in the study of the role of economic conditions in political-preference
formation, which represents a key issue in economic voting theory. According to
Zaller and Feldman (1992), economic voting occurs, or is particularly influential,
when changes in the economic environment impact people’s circumstances, and
when these are felt in a relatively rapid fashion (see also Zaller 1992, p. 48). Models
of economic voting on valence issues (i.e., unemployment, GDP growth, inflation
rate) typically operate within a time frame of 12 to 18 months (e.g., Lewis-Beck
2006; Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2011). Effects of economic shocks on an individual’s
policy preferences have recently been found to be of vital importance to actual
preferences, but they (a) fade away during economic normalisation and (b) carry
little explanatory weight for vote choice (Margalit 2019).
How do voters integrate knowledge of the past, present experiences, and future
considerations into their preferential calculus? Fiorina (1981) coined the term “ret-
rospective” voting, which he tied to voters’ ability to assess personal as well as
macroeconomic circumstances, and to ascribe political responsibility for specific
issues encountered personally or by society at large (the “running tally” of party
identification). Voters assume that—and test whether—evaluation of past policy
performances and promises will hold up in envisaging politics during future elec-
toral and legislative cycles. Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2019) recently found that
sociotropic (macro-level) retrospective economic evaluations dominate the economic
vote choice.
Still, the question remains as to whether preference formation is generally
unattached to individual concerns (pocketbook evaluation)? In the end, preferences
emerge and/or are shaped by interactions between individuals and their environment
(e.g., peers, mentors, groups and masses, birth order within the family). We find
ample evidence for the presence of sociotropic evaluations:
 Empirical analyses suggest that individual economic circumstances work in con-
junction with individual perceptions of relative positioning in society and so-
ciotropic evaluations of valence issues to shape political preferences (Lewis-Beck
1985; Healy et al. 2017). A number of studies have demonstrated that the rela-
tive weight carried by pocketbook vs. sociotropic evaluations in elections is de-
pendent on the specific features of politico-institutional systems, notably driven
by divided government and incumbency in presidential systems of government
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(Campbell et al. 2010; for coalition governments in parliamentary systems, see
Debus et al. 2014). According to Gomez and Wilson (2001), pocketbook voting is
more frequent among more sophisticated voters, who share a better understanding
of collective political responsibilities.
 Perceived injustice represents a powerful predictor of political preferences in lib-
eral democracies. Considerations of fairness or “deservingness” are key drivers
behind citizens’ welfare-state program attitudes (Alesina and Angeletos 2005;
Brown-Iannuzzi et al. 2014; Attewell 2021; for the role of civic duty, see Mullinix
2018).
3.2 New Social Risks
Of course, an individual’s needs in terms of economic and social well-being vary
dramatically by age, education, job situation, and family relations. The dynamic,
vibrant research on social risks over life cycles takes systematic account of factors
such as time variance, individual-level evaluation of long-term prospects, and new
societal gaps that have emerged in part from the dissolution of national boundaries
(e.g., Wren and Rehm 2013; Schwander 2019). First, what are the types of so-
cial risks that shape citizens’ preferences over pivotal socioeconomic policies and
codetermine party choice? The dominant theoretical approaches to the comparative
political economy of the welfare state stipulate that voters evaluate social policy
along two dimensions: redistributive effects and risk hedging (Cusack et al. 2006;
Rehm 2009; Rehm et al. 2012; Barber et al. 2013). This process is dynamic and in-
corporates retrospective and prospective evaluation. As Iversen and Soskice (2001)
highlight in their asset theory of social policy preference formation, citizens try to
strike a balance between past investment, current consumerism, and future-directed
risk hedging.
In terms of party choice, it is important to note that governments frequently choose
to intervene in this process by mediating work-related risk exposure (and individual
risk perception): clientelistic action that comes with significant redistributive con-
sequences (see the section on clientelism below). This applies to job security and
uncertainty about future income, but also to access to social entitlements and risk
buffering. The literature on “dualisation” that has gained prominence—alongside
risk-based individual-level approaches—sees the interests of “insiders” and “out-
siders” (e.g., immigrants, the atypically employed) as pitted against each other
(Rueda 2007; Rueda and Stegmueller 2019; Dimick et al. 2018). This points to
the permeability of national labour markets. As Rommel and Walter (2018) demon-
strate, offshoreability and selective political clientelism (shelterism) have started to
impact the political-party choice preferences of voters.
3.3 Social Class
Economic models of electoral forecasting portray preference formation as temporal,
dynamic, and comparatively independent of group awareness. This assessment has
generally been in line with a myriad of contributions from various fields and disci-
plines that found a vanishing impact of vertical stratification, i.e., impact of social
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class on preference formation in pluralist, open societies with postindustrial labour
markets (Clark and Lipset 2001; Evans 2000; Evans and Tilley 2012). More recently,
authors have attempted to reconcile the traditional class concept with a shifting class
structure, arguing that neither the simplicity of the Alford index (a simple distinction
between blue-collar and white-collar voters) nor the post-Weberian class scheme of
Erikson/Goldthorpe/Portocarero (EGP), which already highlighted the importance
of occupational background and market prospects rather than pure asset ownership,
are able to take fully into account the presence of new task structures and work
logics, social risks, and risk-hedging strategies in service economies.
Oesch’s class scheme, on the contrary, focusses on the level of marketable skills
and operational work logic to distinguish social strata (2006, 2008). His work high-
lights differentiation within the middle class (i.e., low-skilled service workers who
face sustained constraint on wage growth). The new framework depicts a rotat-
ing primary axis of preferential polarisation that helps to explain the defection of
(a) production workers towards the radical/populist right and (b) highly educated so-
ciocultural professionals in possession of high levels of marketable skills favouring
leftist–libertarian movements across polities (Oesch 2012). Similarly, Kitschelt and
Rehm (2014) incorporate organisational theory and labour psychology to establish
class boundaries. The authors claim that generalisation and transposition permitted
by work experiences exert a major influence on the formation of political attitudes
in general (for Germany, based upon a similar framework, see Müller and Klein
2012).4
This reenergising of the class concept in political science also represents a push-
back against claims of social destratification, decomposition of group thinking, and
the predominance of identity politics and cultural issues in general. Based on the
adapted framework advanced in the work of Oesch, Kitschelt and Rehm and others,
social class background indeed has been shown to inform an individual’s preferences
across key policies/issues in a theoretically consistent and predictable way (Oesch
2012; Lefkofridi et al. 2014; Kitschelt and Rehm 2014; Beramendi et al. 2015;
Thewissen and Rueda 2019). It relates to insights from the literature on social-pol-
icy preference formation that attributes the formation of social risks and shaping
of social-policy preferences to individual occupational characteristics rather than to
industry-level propensities (Rehm 2009).
These conceptual adaptations to postindustrial stratification have come under lit-
tle scrutiny thus far. Regrettably, net effects on, for example, vote choice and sets
of key programmatic issues are rarely tested in a comprehensive manner. How-
ever, neoinstitutionalists remain suspicious regarding the homogeneity of collapsed
classes (e.g., the eight-class scheme introduced by Oesch in 2006) and insist on
stratification within certain classes (for sociocultural professionals, see Hall 2016,
p. 386).
4 Most studies in this field rely on the International Labor Organization’s elaborate ISCO-coding scheme
featured in the European Social Survey. KLEMS data released by the European Union adds valuable items
at the household level.
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4 Top-down or Bottom-up? Leaders and Followers
Similar to clientelistic particularism, citizen preferences that are attached to political
leaders are in need of reconciliation with democratic core values. Leadership is at
odds with democratic routine politics, at least if defined as making a difference to the
lives of many people through leadership qualities and styles that are rooted in char-
acter traits (e.g., erratic behaviour rooted in low self-esteem that causes diplomatic
failure of large-scale consequence, including the outbreak of war, a government shut-
down, or provoking of a systemic crisis).5 Revealingly, personalism and charismatic
leadership feature prominently in concepts that deal with democratic imperfections,
including populism, anti-institutionalism, and authoritarian political views (Adorno
et al. 1982; Malka et al. 2020).6
Despite notions of a hollowing out of leadership, notably in compound
(semisovereign) polities and countries characterised by excessive party govern-
ment (e.g., Belgium and Italy), leaders and leader–follower relations represent both
a relevant subject and an object in the study of preference formation. On the one
hand, political science has shown a growing interest in studying the effects of
personalistic relationships between leaders and followers. On the other hand, the
advent of follower-centric approaches of generic leadership studies provides an in-
depth look into the nature of political followership.
4.1 Charismatic Leadership and Democratic Personalism
Political science has long considered the influence of political leaders on citizens’
political behaviour to be limited in comparison with other influences, such as parties
or ideologies. This view has been partly eroded over the past 20 years. Many re-
searchers recognise that modern democratic politics has become more personalised
(Poguntke and Webb 2005; Rahat and Kenig 2018; Pedersen and Rahat 2019) and
that it generates more significant leader effects than it did in the past, at least at the
polls. That said, net effects in the arena of electoral politics and linkage building
are hard to establish. Direct effects should not be overestimated, as citizens/voters
tend to perceive both parties and candidates through the lens of partisanship and
ideological proximity. In other words, the evaluation of leaders appears mediated
through preferences preformed elsewhere (see section 2.3).
Nevertheless, individual political actors are directly and indirectly more impor-
tant, and they are clearly more visible in the process of preference formation relative
to structural factors than suggested by, for example, cleavage theory and advocates of
social stratification causality. Where does the influence of individual political actors
come from? Personalised politics is twofold. First, politicians seek to capture the
centre stage of politics and convey a favourable personal image. Second, citizens’
5 Even in times of acute crisis rooted in existential threats, public preference has exerted pivotal restraining
influence upon executive power. See Abendroth’s (1964: 309) praise for Churchill’s failed reelection bid
in 1945.
6 Correspondingly, we observe a reduced academic interest in the mentality and attitudes of collectives
such as legislators (Kam 2001; Ringe 2005) and political elites in general.
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and politicians’ individual personalities, traits, and values are crucial in the process
of translating preferences into actual decisions. For example, the valence model of
personalised politics (Clarke et al. 2004) suggests that voters seek to support those
leaders who appear more competent (effective) in comparison with other contenders.
In a similar vein, Caprara and Zimbardo’s (2004) empirical model of leader–voter
congruency emphasises the importance of trait-based similarities. According to their
model, voters seek and support politicians who match their own personality. They
note the following:
We want to trust competent leaders, but we also want to like them personally,
and this is easier when they are perceived as essentially similar to us. The ex-
tent to which voters perceive their leaders’ personalities as similar to their own
is critical in humanizing abstract icons and endorsing politicians’ efforts and
claims (Caprara and Zimbardo 2004, p. 590).
The findings on personalisation and the impact of leaders on voting behaviour
are mixed and inevitably inconsistent because studies have not followed a clear and
unified conceptual and methodological approach to understanding the dynamics of
political leadership in the electoral context. These studies face three limitations. First,
studies of personalised politics struggle with severe conceptual uncertainty (Peder-
sen and Rahat 2019; Pruysers et al. 2018). Second, the different factors (ideology,
cases, parties, and leaders) and their effects upon citizen preferences have always
been difficult to separate, resulting in a logical loop between independent and de-
pendent variables (the problem of endogeneity; Garzia 2014). Third, the personal-
trait approach that researchers apply when they focus on perceptions of leaders’ and
followers’ values, traits, and personalities (Caprara and Zimbardo 2004) is insuf-
ficient to understand the complex dynamics involving the effects of leadership on
preference formation.
In addition to the study of leaders’ effects on electoral outcomes, the research
has also given attention to the “follow-the-leader” behaviour from leaders’ effects
on electoral outcomes, shedding light on the complex relationship between leaders
and followers’ preferences. Challenging conventional wisdom about leader effects,
scholars have found that leader cues—the political actors’ position-taking on a policy
issue—significantly impact public opinion, resulting in changes in voter preferences.
Gabriel Lenz (2012) demonstrated in Follow the Leader? that people first choose
what political leader they want to support and then adopt their policy view, rather
than the other way around. In short, people modify their opinions to match their
leaders’ preferences. A series of studies also very recently provided strong empirical
evidence for this argument: Citizens still support their preferred leaders even when
the leaders in question find themselves taking public policy positions which were
previously supported by rival parties or which they had opposed when they were not
in government (Agadjanian 2020; Barber and Pope 2019; Broockman and Butler
2017). In turn, this makes citizens vulnerable, as leaders may not act like voter
agents, and consequently, it can be questioned whether such leaders recognise voters
as principals; leaders do not act like their “agents” or recognise them as “principals.”
Based on an impressive data-gathering operation, Druckman and Jacobs (2015) in
K
A Tale of Odds and Ratios: Political Preference Formation in Postindustrial Democracies
Who Governs?7 unveil possibilities for U.S. presidents to pursue effective agenda
manipulation (compare the concept of heresthetics in Riker 1986).
4.2 Bottom-up Follower Centrism
One question remains open: Why do people choose a particular leader to follow?
Public and political leadership studies have not yet provided an answer to this ques-
tion. Although the research community has recently been calling for more follower-
centric research, (Blondel 2014, pp. 711–712; Hartley 2018, pp. 209–210), political
leadership studies tend to remain overly leader-centric, focusing mainly on incum-
bent politicians’ resources, formal positions, and institutional context (e.g., Bennister
et al. 2017; Elgie 2018). From this perspective, the support of citizens is viewed
only as a resource or an outcome of leadership.
In contrast, for follower-centric models of leadership (Shamir 2009), the ques-
tion is not how citizens change their preferences and cast their votes due to the
(re)evaluation of leaders’ political characters, but how they follow and can even
control leaders’ behaviour. As followers perceive and evaluate politicians’ actions
and effectiveness, they project their expectations onto leadership-process–making
leaders to meet those. However, some leaders also can manipulate and create an ide-
alized image of themselves. This relationship goes beyond descriptive representation
or principal-agent relations. Followers become attached to leaders and follow them,
not because of their characteristics or behaviour, but because the leader symbolises
a prototypical, idealistic figure who is able to reduce anxiety, provide psychologi-
cal safety, authentically represent the values and interest of the voter’s group, and
overcome collective challenges.
With their interdisciplinary approach (e.g., social psychology) and mixed method-
ology (e.g., controlled experiments and public and expert surveys; Marino et al.
2018), general leadership studies deal only partly with political actors (e.g., Carsten
et al. 2019), but their conceptual background and valuable findings can lead us to
a deeper understanding of the effects of leadership concerning issues such as trust,
perceived effectiveness, and charisma. For example, it has been found that voters
are more likely to evaluate a leader from their own political party as charismatic
(Alabastro et al. 2013; Pillai et al. 2003; Pillai and Williams 1998; Shamir 1994;
Williams et al. 2018; see section 2.3).8 For leaders, representing key attributes of
their groups (e.g., attitudes, values, and behaviours) is crucial for generating fol-
lowership. Perceived group representation (i.e., “group prototypicality”) results in
stronger identification with leaders, closer personal bonds, and greater charisma
(Steffens et al. 2014). Moreover, if leaders embody ideal-type group members, they
can gain more trust and are seen as more effective, even after a negative outcome
(Giessner et al. 2009). For instance, Donald Trump’s electoral success in 2016 could
be explained by his ability to more effectively represent his group of voters. Accord-
7 The authors picked this title to honour the groundbreaking work of Robert Dahl.
8 Psychological scholarship on the influence of facial cues (e.g., Alrajih and Ward 2014) and voice upon
charismatisation has been scarcely received in the field of political leadership studies, which is clearly
focussed on rhetorical skills as a politician’s means to fully exploit charismatic appeal.
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ing to the perceptions of Republican voters interviewed by Christian et al. (2018),
they perceived Trump as embodying his party’s values more than Democrat voters
perceived Hillary Clinton as representing the values of her party.
5 (Non)Staggered Genetics
Preference formation in the political realm is influenced by birth circumstances, early
childhood environment, family relations, exposure—or lack thereof—to various life
hazards, and occupational characteristics, as well as cumulative social experiences.
Indeed, political preferences never cease to evolve.
5.1 Genetic Predisposition and Determinism
Genetic predisposition also appears to play a role in this process. The be-
haviour–genetic approach has been used to analyse a great variety of political
phenomena, encompassing topics such as political extremism (Ksiazkiewicz and
Krueger 2017) and foreign policy preferences (Stam et al. 2012). Voters’ degree of
political knowledge, a key variable widely used in comparative political research,
has been investigated within the framework of twin studies (Hannagan et al. 2014;
see also Littvay 2019). Most of these studies found evidence for genetic roots
in variations in individual behaviour and preferences. As individuals grow older,
genetic effects seem to be preserved and remain influential against the cumulative
weight of social experiences. Unsurprisingly, studies that trace the basic ideological
orientation of eligible voters back to genetic predispositions are prone to receiving
their fair share of media attention, including coverage by The New York Times (e.g.,
Hatemi et al. 2014). The interactive effects between genes and environment have
not yet been established, though.
Some authors have gone so far as to argue that genes exert a crucial influence
upon political attitudes, values, and preferences. Fowler and Dawes (2008), for ex-
ample, causally linked voter turnout to a simple association between two genes.
Similarly, as part of a meta-study on the influence of genetics on preference for-
mation, Hatemi et al. (2014) nominated isolated genes as exerting insular influence
upon items such as political interest and core beliefs (see similar, Weinschenk et al.
2021). Politicobiologists have delved into the physiological roots of the link be-
tween genes and individual human predisposition towards politics by manipulation
of brain activity. In a study by Benjamin et al. (2012), the authors used dense single-
nucleotide polymorphisms to trace molecular genetics–based heritability, which can
be explained by a great variety of genes.
5.2 Gene–environment Interplay
Genetic-predisposition research has raised the serious prospect of researchers being
able to manipulate individuals’ preferences, or at least attitudes and value-orienta-
tions, through biochemical means. This raises questions both about free (political)
will and of fabricating preferences. Implicit claims of biochemical determinism have
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been met with criticism and have reinvigorated resistance to nature-based physio-
logical studies among social scientists (Bartels 2013). That said, the genetics and
heritability of political values represent just one of several emerging areas of biopol-
itics research. The dominant paradigm has gradually shifted away from orthodox
notions of causality and determinism of variation in human microbiomes towards
chronobiology (e.g., effects of sleep deprivation on political decision-making), and
gene–environment interplay (Ksiazkiewicz and Jung 2020). The latter is of prime
relevance for the study of preference formation.
Both social scientists and scholars of physiological processes (e.g., neuroscience,
evolutionary psychology, and psychophysiology) have increasingly focussed on
overcoming the nature–nurture dichotomy. It has been generally recognised that
“[T]heories of human cognition are ultimately theories of physical, biological sys-
tems” (Newell 1990, p. 42). However, solely deterministic views have been rejected,
with the argument being made that complex traits involve proteins encoded into large
sets of genomes, and the interactive effects change over time. Furthermore, as Char-
ney and English (2012, p. 30; see also Littvay 2020) emphasise,
[O]ne of the major theoretical conclusions to emerge from the discipline of
computational and systems biology, which attempts to mathematically model
biological networks, is that causation in bio-logical systems runs in both di-
rections: upward from the molecular level (which includes the genome and the
epigenome) and downward from all other levels: cellular tissue, organ, organ-
ism, and external environment.
This emphasis on permanent feedback and feedforward loops already resembles
the outline of Druckman and Lupia (2000), who stress patterns of adaption and
ranking procedures in preference formation: “[A] preference serves as a cognitive
marker that reminds people how to interact with various aspects of their environ-
ment” (2000, p. 2) Therefore, the approaches taken by social scientists and scholars
of physiological processes in the study of preference formation seem to be generally
compatible.
6 Summary and Outlook
What are the major lessons to draw from this survey into contemporary scholarship
on political-preference formation? Despite advances made in many areas, there is
no indication of an emerging consensus on key questions such as the changeability
of preferences. This is a direct consequence of the multiplicity of approaches and
methods that have been used and the myriad of social phenomena addressed. This,
in turn, has led to progress in two areas. First, our understanding of processes of
preference formation has advanced significantly and now engages with a greater
variety of objects (e.g., the entanglement of policy and nonpolicy domains of eval-
uations). Second, we observe the reaffirmation of pivotal theories and key concepts
in adapted form against widespread challenge. This applies to the roles played by
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social stratification, group awareness, and individual-level economic considerations.
Most of these findings converge in recognising economics-based explanations.9
Other strands provide great insight into the functioning and stability of con-
temporary democracy. Despite conceptual and methodological problems, political
science was able to point out the impact of personalistic relationships on key polit-
ical phenomena such as policy choice and voting behaviour. Whether it is viewed
from a leader’s or followers’ perspective, the leader–follower relationship is one of
the central dynamics of preference formation. This paradigmatic shift closely re-
flects upon the embeddedness of governance and political competition in the web
of cultural diversity, personalisation, digitalisation, and political mobilisation that
characterises today’s Western societies.
In this spirit, we consider political polarisation to be a particularly fruitful area
for future research. It has been established that the polarisation of preferences at
the mass level endangers democratic stability and performance (Graham and Svolik
2020). Besides economic conditions that are more diverse than during the era of wel-
fare-state expansion following World War II, what else is contributing to increasing
polarisation? As much as we should refrain from assuming that trends of personali-
sation of politics lead to increased changeability of preferences and democratically
deficient practice, the rise of social media, routinely perceived as the “dark side” of
social engagement (Vassallo 2020), should not be automatically equated with (in-
creased) social and political polarisation. First, the influence of social media upon
political-preference formation appears to be not only ambiguous but also overrated
compared with the influence exerted by political elite behaviour, political misinfor-
mation campaigns, and the use of conventional media (Tucker et al. 2018). Second,
the echo-chamber effects generated by social media usage can be countered by peer
mediation and individuals having diverse social ties (Messing and Westwood 2014;
Anspach 2017). While network heterogeneity and cross-cutting exposure, in turn,
do not automatically lead to depolarisation (Lee et al. 2014), it seems important
to explore (a) the origins of citizens’ motivation to seek reinforcement of their po-
litical views, (b) the mechanisms they utilise for this purpose (e.g., self-selection),
and (c) the effects of different modes of preference formation on the degree of
polarisation.
Looking at methodology, experimental design promises to increase the number of
testable hypotheses (Druckman et al. 2011; Druckman and Lupia 2012). Controlled
settings of exploration enable efforts to unravel confounding variables, which in
turn promote our understanding of the explanatory weight attached to hitherto either
unsystematically related or competing approaches. For example, epigenetics, which
is the study of processes in which heritable phenotype changes take place in the
absence of alterations in the DNA sequence, represents a potential key to discover
and describe clearer mechanisms explaining the effects of genetic interindividual
9 The continued influence of social-class membership implies that key preferences among individuals are
relatively stable. The resilience of the concept of party identification and the weight of socioeconomic eval-
uations point in the same direction. That said, plenty of studies indicate a growing potential for volatility of
preferences rooted in, for example, late campaign dynamics fostered by the personalisation of democratic
processes (Ekstrom and Federico 2019) and event-based reconsideration (Landau-Wells and Saxe 2020).
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differences on the evolution of preference formation. Epigenetic studies allow the
analysis of temporal variability in gene expression within individuals, both in the
short term (e.g., over the course of an election cycle) and in the long term (e.g.,
looking at life-course effects).
In other words, this perspective potentially addresses the divisions that set apart
major strands of research, demarcation lines drawn over issues such as the her-
itability of political preferences and attitudes, the role played by sociotropy, and
retrospectiveness (i.e., experiences with and knowledge of political actors’ past per-
formance) in forming preferences based on considerations of economic well-being.
Clearly, studying preference formation calls for an interdisciplinary approach.
Genetic predisposition, the pursuit of economic self-interest, and the web of social
interactions that ties individuals to groups and society (Laitin and Wildavsky 1988)
play a distinct but unequal role in the formation of political preferences. The chal-
lenge for future research is no less than to close theoretical and empirical gaps in the
study of “how [...] environments, including social and political institutions, shape
our biology and how [...] our biology affects our environments” (Ksiazkiewicz and
Jung 2020, p. 14).
Altogether, research into gene–environment interplay comes with profound
checks on the robustness of empirical findings by gaining the ability “to test com-
plex genetic and social pathways from attitudes to decisions” (Littvay 2020, p. 14).
The lessons scientists will be able to take from such research promise to benefit
a wide range of approaches already taken and advanced in the study of political-
preference formation!
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